Douglas J. Feith, a professor at Georgetown University, provides a different take on the outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld than the caricature that the public has been sold for years.
Feith served as the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from July 2001 until his resignation on August 8, 2005.
In Sunday's Washington Post, Feith wrote a piece to set the record straight about Rumsfeld, "The Donald Rumsfeld I know."
The same piece appeared in Sunday's St. Paul Pioneer Press with a more complete title, "The Donald Rumsfeld I know isn't the one you know."
Feith attempts to dispel some of the Rumsfeld myths and undo a bit of the merciless demonization that Rumsfeld has endured.
He writes:
Much of what you know about Donald Rumsfeld is wrong.
I worked intimately with Rumsfeld for four years, from the summer of 2001 until I left the Pentagon in August 2005. Through countless meetings and private conversations, I came to learn his traits, frame of mind and principles -- characteristics wholly at odds with the standard public depiction of Rumsfeld, particularly now that he has stepped down after a long, turbulent tenure as defense secretary, a casualty of our toxic political climate.
I know that Don Rumsfeld is not an ideologue. He did not refuse to have his views challenged. He did not ignore the advice of his military advisers. And he did not push single-mindedly for war in Iraq. He was motivated to serve the national interest by transforming the military, though it irritated people throughout the Pentagon. Rumsfeld's drive to modernize created a revealing contrast between his Pentagon and the State Department, where Colin Powell was highly popular among the staff. After four years of Powell's tenure at State, the organization chart there would hardly tip anyone off that 9/11 had occurred -- or even that the Cold War was over.
Rumsfeld is a bundle of paradoxes, like a fascinating character in a work of epic literature. And as my high school teachers drummed into my head, the best literature reveals that humans are complex. They are not the all-good or all-bad, all-brilliant or all-dumb figures that inhabit trashy novels and news stories. Fine literature teaches us the difference between appearance and reality.
Because of his complexity, Rumsfeld is often misread. His politics are deeply conservative, but he was radical in his drive to force change in every area he oversaw. He is strong-willed and hard-driving, but he built his defense strategies and Quadrennial Defense Reviews on calls for intellectual humility.
Those of us in his inner circle heard him say, over and over again: Our intelligence, in all senses of the term, is limited. We cannot predict the future. We must continually question our preconceptions and theories. If events contradict them, don't suppress the bad news; rather, change your preconceptions and theories.
Feith goes on:
Rumsfeld never told Gen. John Abizaid or Gen. Tommy Franks that U.S. Central Command could not have the number of troops that the commanders deemed necessary. Rumsfeld is more politically sensitive than that -- he would never expose himself to the risk of a commander later saying that he had denied him the forces needed. If other generals are unhappy with the troop levels in Iraq, the problem is not that they failed to persuade Rumsfeld, but that they failed to persuade Abizaid or Franks.
Historians will sort out whether Rumsfeld was too pushy with his military, or not pushy enough; whether he micromanaged Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, or gave them too much slack. I know more about these issues than most people, yet I don't have all the information for a full analysis. I do know, however, that the common view of Rumsfeld as a close-minded man, ideologically wedded to the virtues of a small force, is wrong.
Rumsfeld had to resign, I suppose, because the bitter political debate of recent years has turned him into a symbol. His effectiveness was damaged. For many in Congress and the public, the Rumsfeld caricature dominated their view of the Iraq war and the administration's ability to prosecute it successfully. Even if nominee Robert Gates pursues essentially the same strategy, he may command more public confidence.
What Rumsfeld believed, said and did differs from the caricature. The public picture of him today is drawn from news accounts reflecting the views of people who disapproved of his policies or disliked him. Rumsfeld, after all, can be brutally demanding and tough. But I believe history will be more appreciative of him than the first draft has been. What will last is serious history, which, like serious literature, can distinguish appearance from reality.
What are the odds that Feith's opinion will alter the public's perception of Rumsfeld?
Slim to none.
Still, I find Feith's perspective enlightening.
He provides a description of a complex man rather than the one-dimensional cartoon character that so many government officials and the lib media have spoon-fed Americans since the war in Iraq began.
Strong personalities, like Rumsfeld, elicit strong reactions.
Some of his colleagues can't stand him. Others respect and admire and appreciate him.
I think it's important to take the spectrum of opinions into account.
According to Feith, dismissing Rumsfeld as a "close-minded man, ideologically wedded to the virtues of a small force" is wrong.
His take on Rumsfeld should be given serious consideration.
As George Orwell said, "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act."
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